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PhilosophyGround >> Confused on Kant's: Moral Agent...
| 11/21/05 2:11 AM | |
HOLLYWOOD-MO
Edited: 21-Nov-05 Member Since: 05/30/2003 Posts: 18019 |
One of the conditions states that the person must be capable of setting goals, and capable of having the ability to carry these goals out. If this is so, how do infants fit under this definition of moral agent? Are they allowed classification as moral agent's because of their potential? What about people in PVS? |
| 11/22/05 11:32 PM | |
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HOLLYWOOD-MO
Edited: 22-Nov-05 Member Since: 05/30/2003 Posts: 18030 |
Infants, babies, children - what have you - do not fit under this or any of his theories and prinicples because he does not consider them to be rational beings because they are still dependent on others (parents and old people) to think and decide for them. It is not until they are able to rationalize for themselves that this applies. But if I understand him correctly, if one does not fall under the class of a moral agent, they are not to be granted the same negative/positive privileges as moral agents, correct? So we can do with these infants/handicapped/non moral agents, as we wish? We can hurt them physically? |
| 11/24/05 12:11 PM | |
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FudoMyoo
Edited: 24-Nov-05 Member Since: 01/01/2001 Posts: 12637 |
I have studied Kant´s epistemology, but not so much his ethical theories (except the most basic stuff: the categorial imperative, you shouldn´t treat other humans as means to an end, but as ends in themselves etc). so I´m afraid I can´t help you further. |
| 11/30/05 10:43 AM | |
vermonter
28 
Edited: 30-Nov-05 Member Since: 01/01/2001 Posts: 5686 |
I'm pretty sure Kant is very pro-death penalty if that helps. I don't think he held non-rational beings in very high regard. I don't suppose that meant one should go around killing babies, but if one were to, it wouldnt be wrong. Let us know what you find. -doug- |
| 11/30/05 3:29 PM | |
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HOLLYWOOD-MO
Edited: 30-Nov-05 Member Since: 05/30/2003 Posts: 18107 |
I don't suppose that meant one should go around killing babies, but if one were to, it wouldnt be wrong. That seems to be exactly what he is implying. Babies are not moral agents; but perhaps they could be granted a moral agent because of their potential to become one. In this case, there are specific cases with people in Persistant Vegetative States who do not possess the abilities to be classified under a moral agent. My point isn't that we should be allowed to simply kill all these people, but what about performing all types of tests on them? Would it be fair to perform any number of physical or mental tests, like the Germans did in WW2, do these particular non moral agents? |
| 12/2/05 11:11 AM | |
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vermonter
28
Edited: 02-Dec-05 Member Since: 01/01/2001 Posts: 5701 |
It's been a while, but i'm not possitive what Kant considers a noumenal entity. Noumenal entities exist outside of space and time and have a corresponding phenomenal entity. The answer to your question hinges on at which point a phenomenal entity is no longer connected with its noumenal one (if such a thing occurs, which it appears it does on death). Kant's picture in this regard leaves out some important details to describe the ramifications of his philosophy, and is also fraught with a couple seeming contradictions. -doug- |
| 1/31/06 7:53 PM | |
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vanbjj
Edited: 31-Jan-06 Member Since: 04/14/2002 Posts: 758 |
Kant is riddled with irresolvable contradictions. |
| 2/24/06 6:21 AM | |
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Cabal1
Edited: 24-Feb-06 Member Since: 06/03/2002 Posts: 7402 |
I think Kant would agree with you, vanbjj. |
| 3/2/06 6:32 PM | |
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BrainofPJ
1
Edited: 02-Mar-06 Member Since: 08/05/2002 Posts: 431 |
IMO, Kant would not permit immoral actions towards non-rational beings. Also, I think that the CI would specifically outlaw any immoral action towards kids/vegetable ppl for obvious reasons |
| 3/20/06 6:31 PM | |
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HOLLYWOOD-MO
Edited: 20-Mar-06 Member Since: 05/30/2003 Posts: 19326 |
Also, I think that the CI would specifically outlaw any immoral action towards kids/vegetable ppl for obvious reasons As I understand it, the CI only applies to "moral agents." I imagine the rules would not apply because of the lack of status here. |
| 3/21/06 11:10 AM | |
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BrainofPJ
1
Edited: 21-Mar-06 Member Since: 08/05/2002 Posts: 440 |
I think the CI only applies to rational agents in the sense that it is their imperative. However, I think I can recommend moral actions towards non-rational agents. |
| 4/15/06 2:38 AM | |
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HOLLYWOOD-MO
Edited: 15-Apr-06 Member Since: 05/30/2003 Posts: 19675 |
However, I think I can recommend moral actions towards non-rational agents. What do you mean that "you" can recommend? My post was in reference to Kant. What would your oppinion be on Kant? |
| 4/21/06 8:06 PM | |
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Indrek R.
Edited: 21-Apr-06 Member Since: 07/04/2002 Posts: 1050 |
Indirect duties would probably help with moral actions towards infants and other non-rational beings who have a potential for rationality (or even if they don´t) |
| 6/8/06 6:04 PM | |
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Indrek R.
Edited: 08-Jun-06 Member Since: 07/04/2002 Posts: 1160 |
It is the same with Kants indirect duties view.. |
| 6/11/06 12:31 AM | |
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HOLLYWOOD-MO
Edited: 11-Jun-06 Member Since: 05/30/2003 Posts: 20462 |
Snap, so you are saying that you can not destroy the possession of another moral agent. I can accept this because it could void the categorical imperative, in it's violation of property. I can accept this, but to make the assumption that a human being (baby) or animal (dog) is the "possession" of another being, simply because of financial or genetic commitments is a stretch for me.
<i>Indirect duties would probably help with moral actions towards infants and other non-rational beings who have a potential for rationality</i>
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